Abstract. For consumers, managing privacy online requires navigating a complex process of interrelated choices. This process may be conceived of as "cascaded," in that a combination of upstream choices (e.g., of privacy settings on a social network site) and downstream choices (e.g., of what to reveal on the site) together determine ultimate privacy outcomes. In a series of experiments, we examine the potential impact of choice architecture in cascaded privacy choice settings. We investigate how changes in choice frames implemented by service providers can influence consumers' upstream disclosure settings, often in ways that they are unaware of and that may be destructive to them. Whether the effects of choice frames upstream are ultimately detrimental to individuals' privacy, however, depends on whether they are offset by more or less protective downstream choices. Thus, we also examine whether such upstream effects of choice architecture are "mitigated" through changes in downstream self-disclosure. We find, first, that various manipulations of decision frames, common in privacy contexts, significantly impact participants' upstream choice of disclosure settings. Second, we do not find evidence that the impact of choice architecture upstream is mitigated downstream: participants' self-disclosure rates do not adjust or change in response to choice architecture-induced changes in upstream choices. These findings call into question both policy makers' and industry advocates' reliance on choice-based privacy protection mechanisms, contribute to an emerging behavioral perspective on privacy decision making, and highlight the importance of accounting for the cascaded nature of privacy decision making in both policy and managerial settings.
Introduction
Consumer privacy decision making is often cascaded: a combination of early "upstream" and subsequent "downstream" choices together determine some ultimate privacy outcome and its associated benefits and costs. For example, a person might first decide whether to get on a particular platform (such as Twitter, Facebook, or Snapchat) and then, if the decision is affirmative, decide what to post on the site. A patient may first decide whether to sign a form consenting to various uses of his health information, and then decide how much health information to disclose to a provider. An individual solicited for a marketing survey may decide whether to respond (and whether to provide her full name to the survey company), and then (perhaps in part dependent on whether she provided her name) what to disclose in her responses. In all of these examples of cascaded choices, the ultimate privacy outcome, along with its associated benefits and risks, depends on a series of upstream and downstream choices. Cascaded privacy choices are particularly common online, due in no small part to industry and policy makers' reliance on "choice" mechanisms as tools for privacy protection (FTC 2012) . For instance, consumers may first be asked to choose profile visibility settings in an online social network, and later decide how much to disclose through that network. They may first select search engine settings (such as searching under an identified, linked account, or not) and then perform more or less sensitive searches using the engine. They may decide whether to use incognito mode on a browser, or privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor, and then engage in online browsing activities. Or they may pick their preferences for who will view their profile on a dating website, and then choose what to disclose on that site. Guidance from the National Cyber Security Alliance implicitly highlights the prevalence of cascaded privacy choices; this guidance points consumers to upstream privacy choices across a variety of technology settings including e-commerce sites, social networks, health wearables, photo and video sharing, mobile devices, search 1 Because overall consumer privacy outcomes are determined jointly by upstream and downstream privacy choices, the cascaded nature of online privacy decision making has important implications for models of privacy decision making and for consumers' privacy risks. However, it has been underexplored in the literature. The dominant focus of the extant privacy literature has been on downstream privacy choices, often in the form of individual self-disclosure decisions (Moon 2000; Dinev and Hart 2006; Xu et al. 2009 Xu et al. , 2012 Acquisti et al. 2012; Brandimarte et al. 2013) . The comparatively few studies that evaluate upstream privacy choices tend to investigate them separately from their associated downstream choices (Johnson et al. 2002 , Stutzman et al. 2013 . The lack of studies that evaluate upstream and downstream choices jointly, and that take into account the increasingly cascaded nature of online privacy decision making, represents a significant gap in the literature. In particular, prior work has not considered how factors that influence consumers' upstream privacy choices impact overall privacy outcomes when related downstream choices are also accounted for.
This gap is notable because upstream privacy choices, particularly online ones, may be influenced by a variety of factors that are outside of the control of users. One significant reason these factors emerge is that the design of upstream interfaces (such as "disclosure settings") that provide consumers the option to restrict how their downstream self-disclosures are shared and used (e.g., privacy or visibility settings on social networks) remains largely under the discretion and control of online service providers. 2 In many cases, service providers make design decisions that limit which options are available to users upstream (e.g., whether to allow them to opt out of advertising or not). Other times, design decisions made by these providers can result in significant, but subtle, variation in the design of disclosure settings between providers and over time. These decisions have the potential to powerfully impact behavior: research in behavioral economics shows that subtle changes in the design (or "architecture") of choices can profoundly influence consumers' behavior and decision making (e.g., Keller et al. 2011 , Johnson et al. 2012 , Egelman et al. 2013 , Thaler et al. 2014 . These streams of work suggest that the architecture of upstream privacy choiceseven when ostensibly aimed at improving consumer privacy-may be subtly molded to nudge individuals toward greater sharing of personal information, in some cases exposing them to risks of which they may be unaware or that they may underweight (due to, for example, time discounting and/or immediate emotional factors). Although consumers may technically make their own privacy decisions upstream, this choice may be in part illusory, if subtle (and thus likely unnoticed) variation in the design of upstream choices significantly influences the upstream decisions they make. Thus, the first focus of our paper is on whether changes in consumers' choice architecture implemented by service providers influence the choice of disclosure settings upstream.
Understanding how variations in choice architecture influence upstream choices is not, however, sufficient to draw conclusions about their ultimate impact on consumers' overall privacy outcomes. Whether choice architectures that steer consumers toward more or less protective disclosure settings upstream ultimately matter depends on whether their impact is mitigated (or not) by more or less protective downstream choices. Do consumers compensate in their downstream selfdisclosure when decision frames (that they may or may not be aware of) influence the upstream decisions they make? The risk compensation and moral hazard literature suggests that this compensation behavior is likely, and argues that downstream choices can undo the effect of upstream ones. For example, Peltzman (1975) famously raised the question of whether safety innovations in automobiles, such as seatbelts, would ultimately have little or no effect because consumers would take advantage of the increased margin of safety by driving more recklessly. Such downstream compensatory behavior, which is critical to mitigating the effects of induced changes in upstream behavior, may, however, be less likely when changes in upstream choices are a result of the subtle manipulation of choice architecture. Consumers may simply not notice subtle changes to their choice architecture, and even if they do notice, they may fail to anticipate the effect that such changes in architecture can have on their own behavior (Liberman et al. 2004) or fail to react to the knowledge that their architecture has been manipulated . Because this mitigation is critical to overall consumer privacy outcomes but is largely unaddressed in the privacy literature, our second focus is on whether the effects of choice architecture on upstream choices are mitigated by more or less protective downstream privacy choices.
We address both of these goals of the paper in four randomized experiments. To increase the ecological validity of the experiments, all experiments ask participants to make actual privacy choices and selfdisclosures rather than hypothetical or self-reported choices.
Experiments 1, 2, and 4 address the first goal of the paper and evaluate whether the propensity to select protective upstream disclosure settings (e.g., opting into encryption or restricting a use of personal information) is significantly impacted by subtle changes in decision frames: "the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated 3 with a particular choice" (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, p. 453) . Specifically, we focus on the impact of changes in decision frames induced by common real-world variations in the presentation of these disclosure settings. We based framing manipulations on examples that are common in online privacy contexts. For example, choices to provide location information on mobile phones are sometimes presented using a "Privacy" label and sometimes using a more descriptive "Location" label.
Experiments 2 and 4 address the second goal of the paper and capture both upstream and downstream privacy choices. This allows us to evaluate whether the effects on upstream privacy choices of exogenous changes in choice architecture are mitigated by different levels of downstream self-disclosure. Finally, and again related to the second goal of the paper, Experiments 3 and 4 evaluate whether participants' levels of downstream self-disclosure change when, in contrast to subtle manipulations of choice architecture, participants are assigned to protective or risky upstream disclosure settings in a fashion deliberately intended to make those settings salient. Evaluating how salient interventions affect downstream disclosure helps to rule out concerns that downstream self-disclosure is insensitive to changes in upstream disclosure settings simply because people do not care about privacy-i.e., about the information they reveal.
Across the experiments, we consistently find that various manipulations of decision frames that are common to privacy contexts and online services can significantly alter an individual's upstream choice of disclosure settings. In Experiment 1, participants were 58% more likely to choose protective disclosure settings (upstream choice) when setting labels were changed from "App Settings" to "Privacy Settings." These results were confirmed in Experiment 2, in which we compared a "Privacy Settings" label to a "Survey Settings" label. In Experiment 4, participants were 45% more likely to select more protective disclosure settings when they were presented with settings as a choice to prohibit a use of their personal information (reject frame) than when they were presented with the objectively identical setting as a choice to allow a use of their personal information (accept frame).
Turning to downstream choices, we find in Experiments 2 and 4 that, while subtle framing manipulations induced significant changes in the choice of protective disclosure settings upstream, downstream self-disclosure rates are nearly identical between framing conditions. That is, participants did not mitigate framing-induced effects on their upstream disclosure settings through different levels of downstream self-disclosure. However, when the manipulation of upstream settings was made more salient, in Experiments 3 and 4, subjects assigned to less protective disclosure settings were significantly less likely to disclose sensitive information. This last result confirms that our observed lack of mitigation downstream did not occur simply because participants do not care about their privacy.
In combination, these findings suggest that individuals may not adjust their behavior downstream after subtle factors impact their upstream privacy choices, and call into question the reliance placed by policy makers and industry advocates on choice-based privacy protection mechanisms (Richter 2011 , Chavez 2011 , FTC 2012 .
This work makes a number of contributions. One contribution is to the literature on privacy decision making. In recent years, this literature has grown significantly , reflecting the increasing attention toward privacy in a digital society and the economic trade-offs produced by data protection and disclosures (Adjerid et al. 2015, Goldfarb and Tucker 2011) . Within this literature, recent work (Acquisti et al. 2012 , Adjerid et al. 2017 ) has started to question the dominant normative perspective of privacy decision making that assumes that consumers have stable preferences for privacy and make privacy choices solely based on their associated benefits and costs. Our results bolster this emerging behavioral perspective on privacy decision making that reveals the often incoherent and self-destructive decisions that consumers make. In particular, we highlight the importance of considering privacy decision making holistically as a complex process of heterogeneous and cascaded privacy choices. This allows us to extend the literature in various ways.
The first relates to the importance of framing effects in privacy decision making. A recent focus of privacy research is on understanding the impact of granular control provided by disclosure settings on privacy decision making (Xu et al. 2012 . Prior research has documented significant effects of providing consumers with granular control (e.g., through disclosure settings) on privacy concerns and self-disclosure behavior, and suggests that these effects are independent of whether providing control actually decreases risk. For example, Xu et al. (2012) suggest that providing consumers control through disclosure settings can reduce privacy concerns even when control is "illusory," and Brandimarte et al. (2013) show that the propensity of control provided through disclosure settings to reduce privacy concerns and increase selfdisclosure persists even when the objective risks that consumers face are actually elevated. We highlight a different but related insight: the actual options chosen when an individual is presented with control via disclosure settings are malleable to changes in decision frames that are common in privacy contexts and that are largely independent of the objective costs and benefits of the setting. A second way in which this work extends the behavioral privacy literature relates to cascaded privacy choices, and produces a more overarching insight. When consumers' upstream choices are subtly influenced by choice architecture, they do not seem to perceive a shift in their risk level and do not adjust in downstream choices to mitigate this change in upstream risk. However, when consumers are simply assigned protective or risky upstream choices, they do seem to perceive a shift in their risk level and do adjust their downstream choices; this indicates that they do care about their ultimate level of privacy, and suggests directions that privacy regulation could take. Together, these results underscore the potential of an emerging behavioral perspective on privacy decision making to inform our understanding of privacy decision making in complex and heterogeneous online choice settings. Finally, these insights may also extend beyond the privacy context to other cascaded decision making contexts, particularly when choice architecture is likely to have powerful impacts on consumers' decision making.
The research we report in this paper also contributes to a small but growing body of work aimed at addressing the gap in research at the intersection of behavioral economics, choice architecture, and technologymediated choices. This gap has been noted by both decision sciences and information systems scholars. Specifically, Johnson et al. (2012, p. 491) highlight the need to consider the intersection of choice architecture and technology contexts since "this interaction with decision technology is likely to increase in future years as computing devices become more unobtrusively integrated into our daily environment." They conjecture that choice architecture could have powerful and persistent impacts in highly customizable and dynamic online decision settings. Goes (2013) echoes this sentiment and suggests that applying insights from behavioral economics to technology settings may yield important insights. Our results illustrate how services online can easily manipulate the choices made by consumers through subtle changes in the way options are presented, as well as how these manipulations can have persistent effects on behavior but ambiguous effects on welfare.
Choice Architecture and Cascaded Privacy Choices
New information technologies have affected the nature of privacy choice. Increasingly, consumers' privacy decision making is cascaded: especially in online settings, privacy risks and benefits are determined by a combination of interdependent choices that consumers often make at different points in time. The scholarly literature on privacy has mainly investigated how various factors impact different types of privacy decision making in isolation from each other. For instance, significant efforts have focused on understanding what drives differences in self-disclosure behavior (e.g., Dinev and Hart 2006) . With the advent of the internet and e-commerce, the literature has also evaluated what alters consumers' willingness to engage in transactions with merchants under various degrees of privacy risk and concern (e.g., Kim et al. 2008) , their interest in using privacy-enhancing technologies (e.g., FischerHübner 2001), and their choice of privacy settings (Stutzman et al. 2013 ). However, the cascaded nature of online privacy decision making has been underexplored in the literature, particularly as it relates to overall privacy outcomes for consumers. In addition, an emerging body of work on privacy decision making has focused on the role of heuristics and decision biases in consumers' privacy decision making. The dominant assumption in the literature that studies consumer privacy behavior has been that consumers are utility-maximizing, rational agents who possess reasonably stable, and thus predictable, preferences for privacy. These economically rational consumers are assumed to weigh costs and benefits in a rational fashion when deciding (for instance) what to disclose and what to keep private (Klopfer and Rubenstein 1977 , Milne and Gordon 1993 , Dinev and Hart 2006 .
In contrast, an emerging behavioral perspective has highlighted how factors arguably disconnected from the objective calculus of benefits and costs of information sharing, and often out of the control of users, can have a powerful influence on actual privacy choices (Moon 2000 , Acquisti et al. 2012 . In fact, the behavioral decision research literature has highlighted how the design (or "architecture") of decision settings can influence, ameliorate, or even impair individuals' decision making, and therefore their welfare. This literature highlights how apparently insignificant changes in the design of services, policies, and interfaces can have significant impacts on behavior (Thaler et al. 2014) . For instance, seminal work on choice architecture finds that simply changing the default option for organ donation from opt-in to opt-out can dramatically change individuals' expressed willingness to donate (Johnson and Goldstein 2003) . In the context of privacy, researchers have investigated how privacy choice architecture can significantly affect individual privacy decision making (Almuhimedi et al. 2015) . While the privacy literature as well as the broader choice architecture literature has focused on design changes that ostensibly improve consumer decision making (Johnson et al. 2012) , manipulations of choice architecture do not always promote consumer welfare. Thaler et al. (2014) point out that "choice architects do not always have the best interests of the people they are influencing in mind" and that "wily but malevolent" architects can have devastating effects on the people who are influenced by them. This can also be the case 5 when it comes to privacy settings, where choice architecture can be employed to shift consumers toward behaviors that primarily benefit data collection organizations . Together, the literature on behavioral privacy and that on choice architecture suggest that variation, whether naturally occurring or deliberately orchestrated, in the complexity and presentation of privacy decision making can significantly impact consumers' choices, and that these effects may have ambiguous welfare implications for consumers.
Welfare implications are complicated by the cascaded nature of online choices, since evaluating the impact of alternative choice architectures operating at a single level of privacy decision making may not be sufficient to draw conclusions about impacts on overall consumer privacy risks and welfare. For example, effects of upstream choices that might seem destructive to consumers might be much less destructive if protective downstream decisions are taken that mitigate this upstream effect (see Table 1 ). Whether consumers mitigate the impacts of choice architecture on upstream choices through changes in downstream behavior is informed by works across various fields (e.g., economics, psychology). Some of this literature makes the case for mitigating behavior in downstream decision making. For example, the economics literature on moral hazard (Klick and Stratmann 2007 , Dave and Kaestner 2009 , Kelly and Markowitz 2009 and risk compensation (Peltzman 1975 , Crandall and Graham 1984 , Levy and Miller 1999 suggests that consumers who make decisions upstream that reduce/increase the risks associated with downstream decision making behave more/less recklessly downstream. Offering a perspective from psychology, Wilde (1982) argues that if the risk of a situation becomes lower than an individual's target level, the individual will take more dangerous actions that increase the risk back to that target level, and vice versa-a phenomena Wilde termed risk homeostasis. In contrast, we argue that these mitigating effects may not occur if shifts in upstream choices are induced via subtle manipulations of choice architecture, since consumers may not notice changes in choice architecture or appreciate the effect they have on their own behavior (Liberman et al. 2004 . In the remainder of Section 2, we consider how consumers make privacy decisions in cascaded privacy decision settings, focusing on (1) the impact of varying choice architecture on upstream choices and (2) whether downstream privacy choices vary in ways that mitigate effects of choice architecture on upstream choices.
Because many combinations of upstream and downstream privacy choices are possible, we narrow our focus to a specific operationalization of the terms. For upstream privacy choices, we focus on disclosure settings, similar to choices presented to individuals on popular internet services (e.g., Facebook privacy settings). For downstream choices, we focus on selfdisclosure of personal information that is presumably used or shared in accordance with the disclosure settings selected upstream.
Our focus on disclosure settings is based on the key role assigned to notice and consent mechanisms by both industry and policy makers, for managing online privacy (FTC 2012) . Under such mechanisms, providers of internet services inform end users about possible uses of their data, and provide them with diverse disclosure settings that offer some degree of control over the uses and visibility of their data. We consider the choices made via disclosure settings "upstream" because their overall impact can be mitigated or exacerbated by downstream privacy choices. For example, the risks of choosing to share a social media profile publicly (e.g., through a disclosure setting) can be mitigated or exacerbated by the downstream choice of whether to include sensitive information on that profile. For downstream choices, we focus on individual self-disclosure decisions, because they are a key measure of privacy decision making in both the rational and the behavioral privacy literature (Dinev and Hart 2006, Acquisti et al. 2012) , and because the risk of upstream privacy choices is increasingly tied to subsequent self-disclosure decisions (again because these settings alter the visibility and use of these disclosures).
In the rest of the sections, we propose a general framework of analysis and present three hypotheses, which we test in our experiments. The manipulations we utilize to test these hypotheses vary between experiments and are detailed preceding the experiment in which they are introduced. 
Upstream Choices: Framing
With respect to upstream disclosure settings, we focus on whether framing-a central tool of choice architecture-can influence consumer selections of disclosure settings. Framing refers to the phenomenon of "simple and unspectacular changes" in the presentation of decision problems, leading to changes in choice (Kühberger 1998) . Framing effects are generally attributed to changes in how individuals construe a decision context or stimulus with which they engage. Such changes can include highlighting a particular dimension of a decision context or altering its perceived norms or goals. A substantial empirical and theoretical literature (Levin et al. 1998 ) has evaluated framing effects, focusing mostly on differences in behavior that arise from decision frames that highlight positive versus negative aspects of a given decision. In a task referred to as the "Asian disease task," Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that highlighting costs (lives lost) from a medical intervention versus the gains (lives saved) can lead to an increased preference for risky options; Levin and Gaeth (1988) found that perception of the quality of ground beef differs based on whether it is labeled as "75% lean" or "25% fat"; and Ganzach and Karsahi (1995) found that framing decisions in terms of losses (e.g., losses suffered from not using a credit card) is more effective in altering behavior relative to framing that highlights gains.
Framing effects are particularly relevant to disclosure settings since these settings can be highly complex, vary across services and even within a service over time, and, perhaps most importantly, are provided by firms and services, both online and offline, that maintain significant discretion over which options to present to end users and how to present them. Recent privacy research casts doubt on whether these disclosure settings will actually be used by consumers in selfinterested ways. In fact, extant research has highlighted the paradoxical effect that mere perceptions of control (absent objective changes to risk) can have on consumer behavior-namely, increasing consumers' willingness to disclose more, and more sensitive, information to others . Solove (2013 Solove ( , p. 1898 argues that "organizations will have the sophistication and motivation to find ways to generate high opt-in rates, " and Schwartz (2005, p. 1274) suggests that "many data-processing institutions are likely to be good at obtaining consent on their terms." These concerns are justified, given that other well-intentioned regulatory interventions relying on increased consumer choice have been subverted by the way in which these choices have been presented to consumers.
3 However, this literature does not consider whether highly varied disclosure settings can introduce subtle changes in decision frames that can systematically and powerfully influence consumers' choice of disclosure settings, potentially to their detriment.
Varying decision frames in privacy settings can have these powerful effects if brought to bear on privacy considerations for consumers who are distracted by other, often more salient and immediate, benefits of disclosure (e.g., accessing content, installing a useful application, etc.). This has important implications for the nature of upstream privacy choices: if subtle (and thus likely unnoticed) variation in the design of upstream choices is systematically influencing the upstream decisions consumers make, then choices that seemingly are made by consumers upstream may be somewhat illusory in nature. Whether framing effects will materialize and be relevant in privacy contexts is, however, open to debate. Although the general phenomenon of framing is well established, it is clear from this literature that the strength of framing effects can vary by problem domain and context (Levin et al. 1998) . For example, even seminal framing effects (e.g., those identified in the Asian disease task) have been shown to differ as the probability and size of potential losses or gains vary (Schneider 1992) .
The behavioral literature on framing offers additional relevant insights concerning the general features of decision contexts that exacerbate framing effects. First, the framing literature finds that these effects are especially prevalent when relevant information about the decision context is missing and/or when consumers lack relevant expertise (Schoorman et al. 1994 ). Privacy contexts are often characterized both by a lack of information about the risks and benefits of the decision setting and by asymmetries between what consumers know (or believe they know) and actual data use and privacy risks in popular online contexts (Balebako et al. 2012 ). This suggests that information about privacy decision settings that can reduce framing effects may often be lacking. Second, framing effects are exacerbated when there are low levels of deliberation by consumers. Takemura (1994) found that participants asked to carefully document their decision-making process did not exhibit framing effects. Although numerous surveys (e.g., Turow and Hennessy 2007) indicate that privacy is an issue that arouses significant concern among consumers, this level of deliberation is unlikely in privacy settings since privacy considerations can be secondary to more salient decision points or goals in online contexts (e.g., downloading an application, buying a product, etc.). Prior research suggests that such considerations are only likely to be activated when contextual factors raise the salience of privacy concerns (Acquisti et al. 2012) , and identifies a common disconnect between stated privacy concerns and the level of actual concern revealed by behaviors (see, for instance, Jensen et al. 2005 ). This suggests that framing effects are likely to be substantial in the more common situation where privacy contexts fail to elicit high levels of concern. 7 Taking these overlaps into account, we present the follow hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Framing upstream disclosure settings in ways that highlight diminish privacy concerns will increase decrease the likelihood of selecting protective disclosure settings.
Downstream Privacy Choices
The impact of framing on choice of protective disclosure settings captures only part of the sequence of cascaded privacy decision making. The choice of disclosure settings alone does not represent the ultimate privacy costs and benefits experienced by an individual who is using an online service. These ultimate privacy costs and benefits also depend on subsequent downstream privacy decisions, including, commonly, how much and what to disclose. The propensity of individuals to alter their downstream behaviors in response to changes in upstream privacy choices and risk is a critical assumption of both policy makers (FTC 2012) and industry advocates of these regulatory approaches for protecting privacy. In its response to FTC regulation, for example, Facebook suggested that consumers who use its service are able to engage in "corrective measures" if they are dissatisfied with the changing privacy options provided to them. Specifically, Facebook suggests that consumers can start by "sharing less information" or that consumers can even "terminate their relationship altogether" (Richter 2011) . Google similarly highlights that its customers can "liberate" their data (meaning that they can download and export all of their data from Google services) and switch to other providers if they are dissatisfied with the protections and options provided to them (Chavez 2011) . Such arguments sidestep the fact that there are sometimes few comparable alternatives to the company's services. Even if alternatives exist and consumers switch to them, there is little guarantee that they will provide better privacy for users. For instance, there is some evidence that younger users are switching their usage from Facebook to Snapchat because of privacy concerns. 4 However, Snapchat has had its own share of significant privacy issues.
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To understand the importance of cascaded privacy decision making, and the relevance of framing effects to this discussion, consider an analogy: the decision context of a driver renting a car from an airport and navigating a difficult winter road. The driver has to make a number of related choices that, together, will influence various outcomes, such as her overall costs, safety, the damage to her vehicle, time to destination, and so forth. Those choices might begin with which car to rent and whether to take out optional insurance, continue with the consideration of which route to take, and then proceed with how to drive when on the chosen route. The ultimate outcomes of the trip are a function of all of these related decisions (e.g., the driver's safety will be impacted by the choice of vehicle, of route, and of care in driving). In this driving scenario, considering a single choice (such as her choice of a route) would fail to capture the complete picture of the benefits and risks the driver faces during the trip. Similarly, turning back to privacy, focusing only on the effects of framing on consumers' upstream selection of different protections (H1) would fail to capture the complete picture of the consumer's privacy benefits and risks. Rather, we need to also consider whether downstream privacy decisions-in our case, what the consumer will choose to disclose via a service-will mitigate effects of framing-induced changes in upstream privacy choices. Can we expect framing manipulations that lead to less protective disclosure settings upstream to be associated with lower levels of self-disclosure downstream?
Whether we observe this mitigation hinges critically on the extent to which consumers compensate in their downstream behavior as a result of changes in risks upstream. The extant privacy literature has evaluated behavioral reaction to changes in privacy protections, and suggests that such compensation is likely. The privacy literature has shown time and time again that individuals compensate in relevant privacy behaviors when their level of protection is altered. Culnan and Armstrong (1999) found that the use of fair information practices by firms can engender trust from consumers, reducing privacy concerns and perceived risks of disclosure; Miyazaki and Krishnamurthy (2002) and Hui et al. (2007) found a significant effect of privacy seals on consumer perception of firm privacy practices and their willingness to disclose personal information. These results, if applied to our setting, imply that factors that alter chosen protections upstream would also be associated with different levels of downstream selfdisclosure.
Perspectives from other fields (for instance, economics) also argue that consumers will compensate for more or less risky upstream choices in related downstream choices. In particular, a number of works suggest that individuals will be more likely to engage in a risky downstream behavior if they can reduce or shift the cost of that behavior via earlier choices. Prior studies have found that consumers who purchase health insurance may subsequently increase their healthcare utilization and their risky behavior. For example, Dave and Kaestner (2009) found that obtaining health insurance reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behaviors among elderly men; Kelly and Markowitz (2009) found that having higher body mass is associated with also having insurance; and Klick and Stratmann (2007) found that legal mandates requiring that insurers cover diabetes care increased the body mass index of diabetes patients. These impacts are attributed to the effects of moral hazard, since initial choices by consumers (such as purchasing health insurance) shift the cost of risky downstream behaviors to third parties. Relatedly, theories of risk compensation and homeostasis theory predict that individuals will alter their behavior in the face of factors or choices that make a particular decision context more or less risky (Peltzman 1975 , Wilde 1982 . For instance, Peltzman (1975) argued that standards that force manufacturers to make safer automobiles, or regulation that requires drivers to wear seatbelts, would be ineffective, in aggregate, because drivers would simply compensate by driving faster or more recklessly. Peltzman found confirmatory evidence for this theory: automotive safety standards intended to reduce traffic deaths caused 10,000 additional deaths, primarily to non-vehicle occupants. Subsequent work also found evidence of the compensatory reactions theorized by Peltzman, but found that benefits from safety regulation outweighed the harm from compensatory reckless driving (Crandall and Graham 1984, Levy and Miller 1999) . Theories of moral hazard as well as risk compensation and homeostasis would predict, similar to the extant privacy literature, that individuals will compensate for higher upstream privacy risk in their downstream self-disclosure behavior (i.e., disclose less) and, in doing so, be likely to mitigate the impact of choosing riskier disclosure settings upstream.
Our focus, however, is somewhat different from the situations described by prior works, in that we are interested in whether compensatory reactions occur when changes in upstream choices are induced via subtle manipulations in the framing of decision settings. We conjecture that, unlike what has been documented in the prior literature, changes in risk induced by subtle manipulations of framing of upstream decisions may not result in the same mitigating behavior by consumers downstream.
One reason for this is that implicit in all of these prior theories is the assumption that individuals are cognizant that their risk has been altered, such that the risk is now perceived as out of sync with their desired levels. For example, regulation that requires all drivers to wear a seatbelt (and which is then subsequently enforced by law enforcement) represents a salient shift in their risk. Drivers who would, absent this regulation, drive without a seatbelt are cognizant of the change in their risk level and may have compensatory reactions that result in mitigating behavior downstream (e.g., faster driving). In contrast, subtle manipulations of choice architecture may not even be noticed by consumers, leading them to attribute their shift in behavior to changes in their own preferences or a rational response to their context or situation. Even if noticed, consumers may fail to anticipate the effect of changes in choice architecture on their own behavior (Liberman et al. 2004 ) and may not alter their behavior even when told their architecture has been manipulated . Liberman et al. (2004) found that individuals consistently underestimate the impact of subtle variation in decision contexts on their own behavior even when it is pointed out to them and they are asked to deliberate on its potential impacts. This suggests that, unlike Peltzman's context, individuals exposed to framing manipulations may simply not be cognizant that their chosen protections have actually been shifted, making compensatory reactions less likely. In fact, Loewenstein et al. (2015) found that the impact of choice architecture (in their case, a manipulation of defaults) persists even when consumers are either pre-alerted that the architecture has shifted or informed after the fact and then allowed to change their choices. These results suggest that framing effects may persist even when individuals are aware that their decision frame has been manipulated-in which case, it seems plausible, they would be less likely to attempt to compensate for such effects. If these arguments hold and consumers fail to compensate for framing effects that result in riskier disclosure settings chosen upstream, it is unlikely that we will observe lower levels of downstream self-disclosure that mitigate this additional risk.
Even if some (potentially weak) compensatory reactions do occur, we may still fail to observe differences in downstream self-disclosure that mitigate the risk from framing-induced changes in upstream choices; if framing manipulations also have a direct effect on downstream behaviors, this may counteract any compensating behavior by consumers. Specifically, we argued previously that framing effects likely influence decision making via their impacts on consumers' construal of decision context and the considerations that are highlighted (or not). In privacy settings, different frames may differentially highlight privacy considerations, thus influencing initial upstream choices. If these considerations remain highlighted (or subdued) as participants transition to downstream self-disclosure choices, this may result in sustained protective (or open) selfdisclosure decisions. This may neutralize the effects of compensatory reactions since consumers who choose less protective settings (as a result of framing) may actually go on to disclose in a more open, less protective, fashion. To make these arguments more concrete, consider again the context of the driver renting a car. Assume she had not intended to purchase additional insurance but is compelled to purchase it by a subtle manipulation of her decision frame that, for example, highlights the potential risks of not purchasing such insurance. Although she is aware that she now has additional car rental insurance, she may have little to no compensatory reactions in her downstream choices (e.g., how carefully she drives) if she does not perceive a deviation from her desired level of risk resulting from the change in her upstream choices. In addition, if framing manipulations impact our driver's decision to purchase additional insurance (i.e., more 9 protection) by highlighting potential risks from driving in an unknown area, this elevated focus on driving risks could result in more careful driving (counteracting any compensatory reactions to having insurance that do occur).
Either a lack of compensatory reaction by consumers, or a direct effect of framing on self-disclosure that counteracts these compensatory reactions, will support our conjecture that choice architecture impacts upstream will not be mitigated by different levels of downstream self-disclosure.
Thus, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Downstream self-disclosure will not differ between individuals assigned to different decision frames, despite objective shifts in protective disclosure settings chosen upstream.
While disentangling the independent effect of the mechanisms behind H2 is beyond the scope of this paper and would make our empirical investigation unwieldy, we do posit a counterfactual hypothesis to help validate our arguments in support of H2. In particular, we argued previously that the lack of mitigation in downstream self-disclosure levels theorized in H2 is because framing-induced shifts in upstream choices (and thus risk) differ from the shifts in risk that were the focus of prior literature (e.g., risk compensation and moral hazard literature, privacy literature). If this is the case, then shifting the same upstream privacy risks impacted by framing in a manner more in line with what the prior literature has considered (e.g., mandatory regulation) should result in the predicted mitigation by consumers downstream. In the case of our driver renting a car, this suggests that state regulation or a workplace policy requiring her to purchase additional insurance would, in contrast to the case where she purchases insurance because of changes in her choice architecture, result in differences in her downstream behavior. In privacy settings, a comparable scenario is one where risky or protective disclosure settings upstream are not shifted via framing manipulations but directly assigned to consumers such that their risk is being more directly shifted. In this scenario, the change in risk upstream would more likely be perceived as deviating from a consumer's desired level of risk, making strong compensatory reactions by consumers that result in differences in downstream self-disclosure more likely.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Downstream self-disclosure will be higher lower for individuals directly assigned to protective risky disclosure settings upstream. Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical arguments made in this section and their corresponding hypotheses. We start with a decision context where a combination of upstream disclosure settings (e.g., privacy and visibility options on a social media service) and downstream self-disclosure (e.g., personal information posted through the service) determine overall consumer privacy outcomes (e.g., the content and visibility of those posts). Within this decision context, we first hypothesize that differences in decision frames will have a significant impact on the disclosure settings chosen by consumers upstream (H1). Next, we consider whether we should expect downstream self-disclosure to differ in ways that mitigate the impact of framing on upstream disclosure settings. We argue that the subtle way that decision frames impact upstream disclosure settings will result in little or no compensation by consumers downstream, and thus no mitigation by consumers. This leads to the hypothesis that consumers will exhibit similar levels of self-disclosure downstream across manipulations of decision frames (H2). Furthermore, we consider the alternative situation where consumers are, instead, assigned (e.g., by the service provider) to more protective or more open upstream disclosure settings. Similar to the framing manipulations, this action by the service provider can result in consumers facing more or less risky upstream disclosure settings (although, in this case, by construction). In contrast to the framing manipulation, however, assignment to different upstream disclosure settings results in much more visible and heavy-handed shifts in upstream risk and, therefore, should result in relevant risk compensation by consumers, and thus mitigation by consumers. As a result, we hypothesize that downstream self-disclosure will differ between conditions assigned to protective versus risky disclosure settings (H3).
Summary of Theory and Hypotheses

Methodology
In four randomized experiments, we evaluate the impact of framing on individuals' upstream disclosure settings (H1), whether impacts of framing upstream are mitigated by different levels of downstream selfdisclosure (H2), and whether direct assignment to different upstream disclosure settings is mitigated by different levels of downstream self-disclosure (H3). Experiment 1 evaluates how the propensity of individuals to select protective disclosure settings (upstream privacy choices) is impacted by different manipulations of choice framing (H1). Participants in this experiment were told that they were being recruited for a pilot study that involved the installation and use of a mobile application focused on financial management. They were then asked whether they wanted to grant permission for this mobile application to use various kinds of personal data on their mobile devices. Participants were told that their decisions would be implemented in the actual app they would need to install and use as part of the study. The primary dependent variable in this experiment is the decision to grant a particular data permission.
Experiment 2 tests both whether framing has an impact on upstream choices (H1) and whether downstream self-disclosure differs as a function of manipulations of upstream choice frames (H2). Participants in this experiment were asked to take an online study that would require them to select a number of disclosure settings that governed how their responses in the study would be shared and used. These choices were deliberately influenced using experimental manipulations similar to those used in Experiment 1. Participants were then asked to provide responses to several questions related to personal, including sensitive, behaviors. Although the ostensible goal of the experiment was to investigate participants' engagements in various behaviors (e.g., "Have you ever looked at pornographic material?"; see examples in Table A .3 in the appendix), we were not interested in the behaviors per se, but rather in participants' willingness to disclose information about engaging in them. Because all of our experiments use random assignments to the different conditions, we can assume the distribution of participants' actual past engagement in these activities to be similar across conditions. Thus, higher or lower admission rates across conditions signal an impact of our experimental manipulations. Prior research has successfully used this approach to examine privacy-sensitive behaviors (e.g., Acquisti et al. 2012 , Moon 2000 .
Experiment 3 focuses on H3 and examines whether levels of downstream self-disclosure differ when participants are randomly assigned to different levels of protective disclosure settings upstream. This experiment uses disclosure settings identical to the upstream choices presented to participants in Experiment 2. Experiment 4 simultaneously tests H1 and H2, but uses a different framing manipulation than Experiments 1 and 2 to test whether our findings are generalizable and not unique to our specific manipulations. We simultaneously test again whether assignment to different upstream protections will influence downstream self-disclosure (H3). A summary of our experiments is in Table 2 .
The four experiments were conducted using Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT), an online crowdsourcing service that has become increasingly popular among social scientists for conducting online experiments. 6 The validity of AMT samples in behavioral experiments has by now been investigated in a multiplicity of studies. Buhrmester et al. (2011) demonstrated that AMT samples are just as representative as other internet samples, and considerably more representative than typical student samples. Steelman et al. (2014) found that AMT samples have psychometric properties that are similar to those of both student and consumer panels, and that using U.S. AMT samples replicated validated results from the technology acceptance model. Furthermore, judgment and decision-making experiments using AMT samples have replicated results found in traditional subject samples (Goodman et al. 2013) .
To select manipulations of decision frames to use in our experiments, we surveyed approaches currently employed by online services for soliciting consumer privacy choice, specifically seeking subtle variation in these approaches that had the potential to highlight or downplay consumer privacy concerns. This focus on subtle variations among existing privacy choice mechanisms allows us to identify manipulations of decision frames that consumers and policy makers may not be likely to identify as significant influences in their own choices, and that are of immediate relevance to the design of these mechanisms and consumer outcomes.
Measures and Estimation
The two dependent variables captured in our experiments are (1) the selection of protective disclosure settings (upstream choice) and (2) downstream selfdisclosures (downstream choice). Since both variables are captured as repeated measures (e.g., participants made multiple choices of settings and multiple selfdisclosures), we use a panel random effects regression as a primary estimation approach, while correcting standard errors for the nonindependence of multiple responses from a single participant Zeger and Liang (1986) .
The first dependent variable (ProtectiveSetting i j ) is a binary measure capturing whether a participant i chose the protective option (e.g., denying an intrusive use of their self-disclosures or opting into encryption) for disclosure setting j. The second dependent variable (Admit i j ) is a binary measures of whether a participant i admitted to engaging in a sensitive behavior j (i.e., self-disclosed sensitive personal information). In some specifications, we also include Y i , a vector with controls for participant-specific characteristics (e.g., age, gender, etc.). The participant-specific random effect is denoted by θ i and u i j is the error term. Estimates on randomly assigned treatments (Treatment i ) are unbiased, because they are uncorrelated with observed (Y i ) and unobserved (θ i ) individual differences and the error term u i j . Although our controls are not necessary for the unbiased estimation of the effect of our treatments on disclosure behavior, we include them in some specifications to rule out breaks in randomization and account for some of the variation in disclosure behavior between participants.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 focuses on Hypothesis 1. It evaluates the impact of framing changes to the labeling of privacyrelevant choices on consumer choice of privacy protections. Online services often obfuscate privacy-relevant choices under frames that are not presented to consumers as "privacy" choices. For instance, consider Figure 2. The Android mobile platform presents choices with significant privacy implications using descriptive labels such as "Location Settings" (at the time of this paper, Android mobile platforms do not have any settings labeled "Privacy Settings"), whereas Apple iOS 7 presents similar choices to consumers under the general "Privacy" label ( Figure 2) . Similarly, Facebook altered the label of the settings on the main Facebook page from "Privacy Settings" in 2013 to simply "Settings" in 2014; this change has persisted into 2017 (see Figure 2) . Similar variation persists in the detailed settings they offer (e.g., "Privacy Settings and Tools" versus "Timeline and Tagging Settings"). Although such changes in labels may appear to be subtle, extant behavioral literature has posited that minor changes in the labels can have powerful effect on consumer decision making. We extend the findings in this literature to the context of privacy. We investigate how changes in the labeling of privacy choices may impact individual choice of protective disclosure settings.
The potential for variations in labels to influence decision making is substantiated by an extensive body of Social media Mobile behavioral research. Burnham et al. (2000) find a strong impact on cooperation in a two-player reciprocity game when labeling participants as either a "partner" or an "opponent." They attribute these effects to subconscious priming of trust in the other player in the game and suggest that "people form expectations about each other's intentions using mental modules that process contextual information." Epley et al. (2006) use the more generic labels of "strategic competition game" and "cooperative alliance game," and also find differences in participant behavior. They suggest that "changing the way the game is described is likely to change participants' beliefs about the normative responses of other participants and to alter participants' own behavior in turn." Liberman et al. (2004) reinforce these results and find that participants are more likely to cooperate when playing the "Community Game" as opposed to the "Wall Street Game." They attribute this effect to a slightly different mechanism, however, and suggest that differences in the description of the tasks or games evokes variation in the perceived norms or goals of the game (e.g., business dealings versus ethical dilemmas).
In privacy contexts, changes in the label of choices may influence behavior if they alter individuals' subjective predictions about the probability that their data would be used in a privacy-invasive manner by the data requestor. Also, changes in the label of choices may alter the individual's construal of the decision goals that are most relevant in a decision context. For example, certain labels may highlight privacy protection goals that may otherwise be subdued by other competing goals or norms in a setting (e.g., obtaining some immediate benefit from data disclosure). Prior work substantiates the potential for these effects to emerge: Acquisti et al. (2012) found that subtle contextual cues can influence self-disclosure behavior by priming or subduing privacy considerations. Thus, we leverage variation in the labeling of upstream privacy choices to evaluate H1 and conjecture that, whether intentional or justified by other platform constraints, labeling otherwise identical choices as "Privacy Settings" relative to an alternative descriptive label will alter the decision frame, resulting in the choice of more privacy-protective options.
Design
Experiment 1 consisted in a two-condition betweensubject design in which participants were asked to choose between different data permission settings, and were randomly assigned to either a condition in which the permissions were presented under a "Privacy Settings" label or one that used an "App Settings" label. Participants were recruited via AMT to take a screening survey for (ostensibly) identifying pilot testers for a new mobile application. Participants were told that this application organizes users' financials and identifies opportunities for savings by analyzing monthly bills and credit card statements. Specifically, participants in the study were told that the application would provide a way to organize their financial documents including credit card statements, bills, and receipts. They were also told that the app would help them organize their expenses and identify areas where they can save money. They were informed that, if chosen for the pilot study, they would be asked to install and use the app for a four-week period as well as provide some of their financial information (e.g., bank account numbers, etc.). The particular context of a financial management application was chosen to ensure a relevant privacy dimension of app usage. To minimize participant suspicions regarding our deception, we created an AMT requestor account named "AAG Mobile Technologies." We also ran a short survey prior to the main study asking descriptive questions about mobile phones and apps usage (participants from this initial survey were excluded from the experiment). Overall, our study was understandable and our deception was effective: following the debrief, participants admitted in their free text response to being fooled by our deception, and indicated that they would be genuinely interested in the app described.
Procedure
Participants were first asked questions about their demographics (gender, age, race, education, etc.), their mobile carrier, the phone they currently own, and their usage of applications to manage their finances. Participants were then presented with the option to allow or deny three permissions randomly selected from a subset of six total permissions modeled after current categories of permission types on mobile platforms (for instance, they were asked whether they would allow our mobile application to collect their location information; the complete list of permissions can be found in Figure A .1 in the appendix).
8 To make these selections relevant to participants, participants were told that their selections in the survey would be used by the app if they were selected for the pilot study. To introduce a cost for choosing restrictive settings, participants were also told that, while their choice to limit some permissions would not influence their chances of being selected for the pilot, it would influence the functionality available in the app (this was presented to them after having the functionality of the app described to them). After making their choices, participants were provided a debrief to address the deception used in the study and were allowed to opt out of the study if they desired. They were also given an additional bonus payment to account for the fact that there was not an actual pilot study (which they would have been additionally compensated for).
Results and Discussion
One hundred and five participants completed the study, four of whom opted out of the study after being given the debrief at the end of the study, leaving 101 usable responses (M Age 33, SD Age 9.9, M Male 0.56). As noted, the experiment had two conditions manipulated between subjects: the permissions provided to participants were presented using either a "Privacy Settings" label or the more neutral "App Settings" label. Every other feature of the experiment was identical between conditions. For each participant, we calculated the proportion of denied permissions relative to total requests and found support for H1: participants presented with choices labeled "Privacy Settings" were 58% more likely to choose the more protective choices relative to those presented with the same choices as "App Settings" (47% versus 30%, t(99) 2.4573, p 0.02).
A random effects panel regression confirms this finding with a positive and significant coefficient estimate on PrivacyLabel (Table 3 , column (1)). A second regression confirms that the results are consistent when including controls for demographics and dummies for the specific setting presented to participants (Table 3 , column (2)). 9 The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence that subtle changes in the labeling of privacyrelevant choices can significantly alter an individual's propensity to select protective options (H1 supported).
To the extent possible, we provided a context similar to the real world, and provided participant decisions that involved actual risks and benefits to them. Overall, our results from Experiment 1 provide evidence that subtle variation in framing can produce substantial shifts in the propensity to choose protective disclosure settings.
Experiment 2
In the first experiment, we found that subtle manipulations of choice framing had a significant effect on individual choices of privacy protection levels, supporting the first hypothesis in our paper. Similar to Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 we consider disclosure settings as the upstream choice and seek to reaffirm that subtle variation in the presentation of these settings can alter individual choice of protective disclosure settings. In addition, in Experiment 2 we also evaluate the second hypothesis of the paper, that downstream decision making will not vary following changes in initial choices of privacy protections. Specifically, we asked participants to make downstream self-disclosures of sensitive information about themselves. We considered these choices downstream (relative to upstream disclosure settings) because participants first had to choose whether to allow or deny particular uses of these sensitive disclosures (e.g., whether other participants of the study could view their sensitive disclosures) and then had to decide what disclosures to make. As such, the risk associated with upstream choices can be significantly attenuated by modifying downstream selfdisclosure behavior. This allows us to assess H2 by evaluating whether downstream self-disclosure decisions vary following framing-induced changes chosen in disclosure settings upstream.
Design, Prestudy, and Procedure
Participants on AMT were invited to participate in an online task advertised as a study on ethical behavior that would require them to first select a number of disclosure settings that govern how their responses in the study would be shared, and then answer several questions related to sensitive behaviors (a sample question was presented to participants in the introductory text). The advertised study context of ethical behavior is a shift from Experiment 1 and is a validated context to evaluate framing effects while also offering an opportunity to study related self-disclosure behavior (Acquisti et al. 2012) . Also, it avoids the need to use deception with participants. When choosing which disclosure settings to provide to participants in the study, we were concerned that disclosure settings that were either too irrelevant or too invasive might result in little variation in what participants decide, irrespective of any experimental manipulation. To address this concern, we recruited 104 participants (M Age 31, SD Age 12.4, M Female 0.34) from AMT to complete a brief questionnaire that asked respondents to imagine that they were participating in a study on ethical behavior, using the same introductory text provided to participants in Experiment 2. Participants were then asked to evaluate the extent to which they would want the choice to opt out of (or opt in to) various uses and handling of their responses. Participants were asked to rank each item on a 1-5 scale, with 1 being "very important" that they would be provided with the choice and 5 being "very unimportant" that they would be provided with the choice. Settings that allowed broad dissemination of individuals' responses (e.g., whether the experimenters could share participants' responses with other participants in the study) tended to be rated as more important relative to more narrow and more commonly expected uses of individuals' responses (e.g., whether research assistants could access their responses)-see results in Table A .1 in the appendix.
Using the data from this prestudy, we finalized the design of experiment 2. Specifically, Experiment 2 consisted of a 2 × 2 between-subject design in which we manipulated the label and also the set of disclosure settings provided. We manipulated whether choices were presented to users using either a "Privacy Settings" or a "Survey Settings" label; in addition, we assigned participants to either "High Importance" choice sets (the four highest-ranked disclosure settings) or "Low Importance" choice sets (the four lowest-ranked disclosure settings; see Table A .2 in the appendix).
Participants were first shown an introductory screen that described the study context and provided an example of the sensitive questions asked in the study. Participants were then asked demographic questions, which included no directly identifying information but asked for their city and zip of residence as well as other demographic information.
10 They were then provided with four choices that related to the use and storage of their responses in the survey. Depending on the condition, participants were shown either high-importance or low-importance settings that were presented as either "Privacy Settings" or "Survey Settings." Participants were then presented with eight questions representing sensitive disclosures (see Table A .3 in the appendix). The questions used were the ones rated as intrusive in Acquisti et al. (2012) , and were presented in random order.
Results and Discussion
Two hundred and four individuals (M Age 28,SD Age 9.7, M Male 0.66) participated in the experiment. We replicated the results of Experiment 1 and found that, on average, participants presented with choices labeled "Privacy Settings" were 56% more likely to choose the more protective choices relative to those presented the same choices as "Survey Settings" (25% versus 16%, t(202) 2.1729, p 0.03). Comparing conditions with high-and low-importance settings, we found that this effect was driven by participants presented highimportance settings (42% versus 28%, t(99) 2.212, p 0.03). For low-importance setting choices, perhaps due to a floor effect, the effect of the label was insignificant ("Privacy Settings" 7% versus "Survey Settings" 4%, t(101) 1.039, p 0.3). Because we did not find significant differences in choice of settings for lowimportance settings, we focused our subsequent analysis on framing conditions of those participants provided with high-importance settings. A random effects panel regression (Table 4 (a), columns (1) and (2)) confirms our initial finding with a negative and significant coefficient estimate (β PrivacyLabel −0.14, p 0.026) for the main effect of the "Privacy Settings" (H1 supported).
Second, we evaluated whether the impact on protective disclosure settings of randomly assigned framing manipulations (where we can expect privacy concerns and underlying propensity for self-disclosure to be comparable between conditions) is mitigated by different levels of downstream self-disclosure. We found that, despite the differences in disclosure settings, participants in different conditions did not exhibit different levels of self-disclosure. Participants who were presented with a "Survey Settings" label admitted to behaviors at a rate comparable to those presented with "Privacy Settings" (53.18% versus 53.65%, t(97) 0.12, p 0.92).
11 This is again confirmed in our random effects panel regression (Table 4 (b), columns (1) and (2)) with a near-zero and insignificant estimate on the effect of PrivacyLabel on admission rates (H2 supported).
Combined, these results have a number of important implications. First, they reinforce our first hypothesis that subtle variation in the framing of disclosure settings can significantly alter an individual's propensity to select protective disclosure settings, particularly for choices that are of high importance to individuals. More significantly, however, we also find support for our second hypothesis that participants will disclose sensitive information downstream at similar levels between manipulations of framing, despite objective shifts in protective disclosure settings chosen upstream. We note that evaluating the direct relationship between the protectiveness of disclosure settings organically chosen by participants and their downstream selfdisclosure is not particularly informative in our context (e.g., as a way to test H3). This relationship is endogenous in practice-individuals who are more privacy conscious will choose more protection and also disclose less than other participants. If the effect of unobserved privacy concerns dominates, then choosing more protection would correlate with less self-disclosure, and conversely if impact of the objective levels of privacy protection dominates. If these effects cancel each other out, there would be no observable correlation between chosen protection level and downstream selfdisclosure.
As we noted in our theory, the lack of mitigation downstream may be due to a combination of different phenomena. For instance, the impact of choice architecture on upstream disclosure settings is not sufficiently heavy-handed to elicit the compensatory reactions identified by the extant privacy literature as well as some of the economics literatures. As a result, we do not observe mitigation of upstream effects, and find no differences in self-disclosure. The second possibility is that individuals do, in fact, compensate when framing induces shifts in their upstream disclosure settings, but that this compensatory reaction is counteracted by direct effects of framing on downstream self-disclosure (see Section 2.2 for more detail on this). Implicit in our discussion is the notion that upstream privacy choices are actually overt and active choices. This may not always be the case. For instance, choices upstream may be implicit and thus, themselves, unnoticed by users. In these cases, however, the effects we identify would arguably be even more likely to hold: subtle nudges focused on less overt upstream choices may be even less likely to be noticed, and thus even less likely to elicit mitigation downstream. This is because users may not only fail to realize they are being nudged, but in some cases they may not even be aware that they made an actual choice at all.
Although we cannot distinguish between these two potentially concurrent mechanisms, the finding that upstream impacts of framing are not mitigated downstream by different levels of self-disclosure still has significant implications for consumers navigating complex and cascaded privacy decision settings. Specifically, it suggests both that individual privacy risks can be impacted by subtle variability in the presentation of upstream decision settings, and that this effect persists due to a continued propensity toward data allowances and disclosure in downstream privacy decision making.
Experiment 3
Our first two experiments provide evidence that a subtle manipulation of decision frames impacts initial choice of protective disclosure settings (H1 supported), but that downstream self-disclosure decisions fail to mitigate this effect and are nearly identical between manipulations of choice frames (H2 supported). Experiment 3 focuses on H3 and evaluates whether simply assigning participants to protective versus risky disclosure settings would in fact impact downstream selfdisclosure.
In addition to the theoretical relevance of H3, testing this hypothesis addresses a more practical concern in our empirical setting. Namely, an alternate explanation for why we do not observe differences in downstream self-disclosure that mitigate the impact that framing has on upstream disclosure settings is that participants may simply not be sensitive to any level of the disclosure settings provided to them in the experiment. That is, participant self-disclosure in our experiment may not vary, no matter how protective or risky the disclosure settings chosen upstream are. This may occur if, for example, participants assume some degree of anonymity in our experimental setting. We sought to preempt this concern in the first two experiments by not assuring participants that they would be anonymous. In fact, a notice of confidentiality protections was purposefully excluded from the consent form (with IRB approval) to avoid this particular concern. Rather, we provided a debrief at the end of our experiment that assured them that their data would be handled in the most protective manner possible. In addition, it is known in the AMT community that participants are not anonymous, since their AMT activities can be linked to their Amazon account.
12 Nonetheless, Experiment 3 alleviates this concern by evaluating whether participants' self-disclosure behavior is sensitive to changes in the protectiveness of upstream disclosure settings.
Design and Procedure
Participants from AMT were again invited to take a study using the same "ethical behavior" context as in Experiment 2. For each of the three disclosure settings rated as most important in Experiment 2, we randomly manipulated (via a graphical notice) whether the disclosure setting was set to be protective (e.g., their responses would not be shared with other participants of the study) or not (see Figure A .2 in the appendix). This resulted in participants being shown privacy notices where, depending on the condition, all three disclosure settings were assigned to be protective all the way down to where none of the disclosure settings were assigned to be protective. We then asked participants to answer the same eight sensitive questions used in Experiment 2. Recall that because of random assignments to the different conditions, we can assume the distribution of participants' actual past engagement in these activities to be similar across conditions. Thus, higher or lower admission rates across conditions signal an impact of our experimental manipulations.
Results and Discussion
One hundred eighty-nine participants completed Experiment 3. We found that the addition of a risky disclosure setting decreased the probability of participants' admitting to sensitive behavior. Specifically, we found that each additional risky disclosure setting resulted in a 3.3% decrease in probability of admitting to a sensitive behavior (β RiskySetting −0.033, p 0.02; Table 5 , column (1)). These results are consistent when including demographic controls for participants (Table 5 , column (2)).
These results provide support for H3 and show that, when disclosure settings are randomly assigned to be more or less protective, downstream self-disclosure varies to mitigate this risk. This is in contrast to when the same protections are shifted via manipulations of choice frames and downstream self-disclosure does not shift. We are, however, cautious to draw definitive conclusions from comparisons between what we find in this experiment and the results of Experiment 2; for example, differences in the samples between experiments (which were conducted at different times) may explain why we observe mitigating behavior here but not in Experiment 2. We address this concern in Experiment 4. Note. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * * p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.
Experiment 4
Experiment 4 tests the three hypotheses in the paper simultaneously. Specifically, it evaluates differences in downstream self-disclosure when upstream disclosure settings choices are deliberately influenced using framing manipulations (H1, H2) and when upstream disclosure settings are simply assigned to be more or less protective (H3). Experiment 4 shows robustness of our results in two ways. First, examining all hypotheses simultaneously helps rule out concerns related to differences in the samples between prior experiments. Second, we modify our experimental manipulations to show robustness of our prior results. In particular, Experiments 1 and 2 used a similar manipulation of choice framing, limiting our ability to draw broad conclusions about the effect of choice architecture and framing in cascaded privacy choice settings. It is possible, for example, that the effects identified thus far are idiosyncratic to our chosen manipulation of choice framing. 
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Thus, we consider in Experiment 4 framing manipulations involving whether privacy choices are presented as a choice to allow a use of personal information (an accept frame) versus a choice to prohibit the same use of personal information (reject frame). Similar to our prior manipulation, variation in accept/reject framing is common across privacy-relevant contexts. For example, Figure 3 illustrates how privacy-relevant choices can be presented to consumers (sometimes simultaneously) as either a choice to allow or restrict access to personal information. Prior research substantiates the potential of an accept versus reject presentation of a choice to significantly influence decision making across contexts, attributing these effects to the potential of these manipulations to differentially highlight competing considerations or motives in choice contexts (Shafir 1993) . Comparable effects have been identified in privacy settings (Acquisti et al. 2013, Grossklags and Acquisti 2007) . For instance, Grossklags and Acquisti (2007) find significant differences between individuals' willingness to restrict information and their willingness to sell or reveal private information. Johnson et al. (2007) propose Query Theory as one explanation of why an accept versus reject frame elicits variation in valuation and judgment. Broadly, they suggest that individuals execute a series of sequential queries (e.g., "What are the advantages of owning this product?" or "What are the disadvantages of owning this product?") to generate judgments. They suggest that if an accept versus reject frame influences the valence and ordering of these queries, it can generate variation in individual judgments of objectively identical options. Consistent with this theory, although substantially predating it, Shafir (1993) posited that positive dimensions of choice weigh heavier under an accept frame while negative dimensions of that same choice weigh heavier under a reject frame. In line with this theory, a reject choice frame in privacy contexts may highlight the negative dimensions of data allowances (e.g., potential repercussions and risks from data allowance) relative to an accept choice frame of the same objective choices. Thus, we use an accept/reject presentation of upstream privacy choices as our framing manipulation in Experiment 4.
Design and Procedure
Experiment 4 consists of a 2 ("Accept Frame," "Reject Frame") + 2 ("Nonrisky Setting," "Risky Setting") between-subject design. The first set of conditions mimic the design of Experiments 1 and 2, and allow us to evaluate the impact of manipulations of choice frames on, first, the choice of disclosure settings (similar to prior experiments), and second, whether differences in disclosure emerge between framing manipulations. In these two conditions, we manipulated, between subjects, the framing of the privacy settings by altering whether participants were presented with the settings as a choice to allow a use of personal information (accept frame) or prohibit the same use of personal information (reject frame). Since, in Experiment 2, framing effects only materialized for high-importance disclosure settings, we utilized only the set of high-importance settings for this experiment (see Table A .4 in the appendix). Afterward, participants were presented with the same eight sensitive disclosure questions as in Experiment 2.
In our second set of conditions, participants were not provided with any upstream privacy choices (i.e., no data settings were presented) and were instead provided with a notice informing them how their selfdisclosures would be used. Whereas the notice in Experiment 3 introduced up to three uses, we introduced only a single use so as to be more consistent with the size of framing effects in prior experiments. As a result, this manipulation is binary. In one condition ("Nonrisky Setting"), participants were provided with a standard research assurance that their responses would be kept confidential and only used for research purposes. In the other condition ("Risky Setting"), participants were instead informed that a risky disclosure setting would be applied to their self-disclosure decisions (e.g., that their responses would be shared with other participants of the study)-see Table A .5 in the appendix, for details of these conditions. The disclosure setting was chosen at random from the four provided in the first two conditions. Participants were again presented with the same eight sensitive disclosure questions as in Experiment 2.
Results
Three hundred individuals (M Age 34, SD Age 10.6, M Male 0.46) participated in Experiment 4. We found support for H1; participants in the "reject" condition were 45% more likely than those in the "accept" condition (58% versus 40%; t(144) 2.655, p 0.008) to choose the privacy-protective option. A random effects panel regression (Table 6 (a), column (1)) confirmed this finding with a positive and significant estimate of the effect of the reject frame (β RejectFrame 0.17, p 0.012). Moreover, we again found that downstream self-disclosure did not vary between manipulations of choice frames: participants presented with the accept framing had comparable admission rates (percent of unethical behaviors admitted to) compared to those presented with the reject framing (51% versus 49%, t(144) 0.65, p 0.52). This is again confirmed in our random effects panel regression with a near-zero and insignificant estimate on the effect of RejectFrame on admit rates (β RejectFrame −0.013, p 0.743; Table 6 (a), column (2))-H2 supported. We also considered whether self-disclosure behavior would vary between manipulations of choice frames when parsing between selfdisclosure related to legal versus illegal behavior. This may be relevant to the lack of differences in selfdisclosure between manipulations of choice frames if participants do not want to admit to illegal behavior regardless of their level of protections or risk upstream.
To evaluate this concern, we parsed our self-disclosure questions based on whether the behavior in question is likely to be illegal in most states in the United States (e.g., theft and using drugs) or not (e.g., making up a serious excuse to get out of doing something)-see Table A .3 in the appendix. We found that downstream self-disclosure did not vary between manipulations of choice frames for both legal (55% versus 53%, t(144) 0.57, p 0.57) and illegal behaviors (47% versus 45%, t(144) 0.54, p 0.59). These results are confirmed in our regression analysis by small and insignificant effects on RejectFrame for self-disclosure related to both legal and illegal behavior (Table 6 (a), columns (3) and (4)).
In addition to this analysis, we evaluated participants' admission rates when they were assigned a risky disclosure setting selected at random from the four used in the accept/reject conditions (RiskySetting is a binary indicator of participants in this condition) versus when they were provided with a standard research confidentiality assurance (see Table A .5 in appendix). We found a significant and negative effect on self-disclosure of informing participants that a risky disclosure setting is applied to their responses (β RiskySetting −0.057, p 0.097; Table 6(b), column (1)). Excluding those who took less than three seconds to read the information provided (13% of participants), we found even stronger effects (β RiskySetting −0.077, p 0.045; Table 6(b), column (2))-H3 supported.
Discussion
With these results, we reinforce support for the main hypotheses of the paper. First, we again identify a significant impact of choice framing on privacy decision making: presenting privacy settings as a choice to reject versus accept uses of personal information elicited significant differences in the choice of protective disclosure settings (H1 supported). In addition, again, we do not find differences in downstream selfdisclosure behavior following shifts in privacy protection driven by accept/reject framing manipulations (H2 supported). In contrast, we find that self-disclosure is adjusted to mitigate risk when changes in the same disclosure settings are directly manipulated via privacy notices (H3). Together the results demonstrate that subtle manipulations of the architecture of privacy choices can meaningfully impact consumers' choice of privacyprotective options. These results also demonstrate that while the impacts of framing upstream are not mitigated by downstream privacy choice, random assignment to risky disclosure settings is mitigated by different levels of downstream privacy choices.
Future Research and Policy Implications
This paper presents evidence that subtle heterogeneity in the presentation of privacy-relevant choices, which occurs in real decision contexts, can trigger or quell consumer privacy concerns, and significantly impact consumers' initial privacy choices. Moreover, we found that significant changes in chosen protection levels upstream did not result in changes in behavior in downstream self-disclosure decisions. In contrast, assigning the same disclosure settings to be protective or risky does result in significant differences in downstream self-disclosure. Our work has a number of important implications for privacy research. First, the research has implications for a body of work evaluating the impact of granular control in privacy settings. This research has identified powerful impacts of providing granular control on consumer privacy concerns and decision making, and suggests that these effects may be paradoxical: Xu et al. (2012) suggest that the effect of control would likely persist even if control was "illusory," and Brandimarte et al. (2013) find that the effects of control persist even when objective risk is elevated. We highlight that choice architecture that subtly influences participants' choice of actual privacy options via control mechanisms is also highly relevant to privacy decision making and consumer welfare.
Second, our work highlights the importance of studying privacy decision making as a process involving interrelated decisions over time; doing so may allow for more holistic privacy research and theoretical models of privacy behavior. While we focus on behavioral models of privacy decision making, future research efforts could also profit from studying cascaded privacy choices using more traditional approaches similar to those used to study moral hazard in insurance markets. The most productive approaches to the topic may involve a melding of behavioral and more traditional economic perspectives. In addition, we consider only two levels of privacy choice that flow sequentially. Future work may relax this and consider cascaded choices that are circular or iterative in nature. For example, participants may choose privacy protections, then choose what to disclose, and then go back and readjust their privacy protections. Studying how choices at one level of choice influence subsequent downstream choices does introduce some endogeneity concerns. There are unobserved factors (e.g., latent privacy concerns) that are difficult to account for empirically but may simultaneously influence many levels of privacy decision making. To reduce these concerns, we chose to evaluate differences in behavior across exogenously assigned groups. An alternative approach may be to rigorously measure endogenous factors (e.g., privacy concerns) and control for them, but this introduces the challenge of accounting for other unanticipated sources of endogeneity (e.g., personality characteristics).
A final research implication of our work relates to why we do not observe an adjustment in downstream privacy decision making. We identify this effect in a fairly specific instance (i.e., following framing manipulations in an upstream choice), and it would be of interest to see the extent to which this phenomenon holds more generally. Relatedly, our paper is not conclusive on the mechanism through which this occurs. We suggest that it could be driven by the subtle nature of framing effects. Future research may seek to disentangle the role of this mechanism, or other mechanisms we have not considered, in driving the behavior we observe in the downstream privacy choices. Along the same logic, there may be conditions under which random assignment may drive stronger or weaker compensatory reactions (e.g., when the shifts in protection are made more or less salient).
There are, naturally, some limitations to these investigations. First, the use of the specific variation that motivates the framing manipulations in our experiments may or may not persist over time. However, we suggest that the relevance of our findings extends beyond any single manipulation of choice frames: as long as consumers manage their privacy via cascaded and heterogeneous privacy choices, designed largely at the discretion of online service providers, similar heterogeneity with the propensity to impact consumer decision frames will likely persist.
These is no direct evidence that the methods that internet providers use to elicit choices of disclosure settings, or the changes over time observed in these settings, are intended to elicit maximal data allowances from consumers. Some of the variation we identified is, no doubt, accidental and some may reflect practical limitations in presenting consumer privacy choices (e.g., there may be too many privacy-relevant settings to include all under the same label). Given the considerable value that firms hope to derive from the collection and use of consumer personal information, however, it would be surprising if they did not strategically leverage subtle variations in choice framing (as have firms in other industries) to elicit greater allowances from consumers via these proposed control mechanisms.
Another limitation arises from the experimental nature of the work, with constraints in terms of external validity, due to context and sample selection. We sought to address these concerns by collecting actual versus hypothetical choice of settings and self-disclosures, modeling experimental manipulations on actual variation in privacy settings, and varying the experimental context of study. If anything, however, we believe that these differences make our experiments more conservative. In real-world settings, where downstream choices are typically made long after initial choices, compensatory downstream decisions seem even less likely than in our experiments, in which downstream choices immediately followed upstream ones.
These limitations aside, these results raise significant concerns about proposed policy approaches to alleviating consumer privacy concerns. Currently, these approaches center on giving consumers more choice, potentially at the expense of supporting consumer protections (e.g., data collection limitation): a recent World Economic Forum Report titled "Unlocking the Value of Personal Data: From Collection to Usage" suggests that new technological options can give individuals control over their own information while allowing data assets to flow relatively freely (World Economic Forum 2013) . A senior advisor for a large technology firm (and contributor to the report) stated that "There's no bad data, only bad uses of data" Lohr (2013) . Our results suggest that providing consumers with greater control over privacy options may be a necessary but not sufficient policy mechanism to address privacy concerns, particularly in contexts where firms have strong incentives to strategically leverage manipulations of choice framing to elicit higher rates of information sharing from consumers . These concerns are exacerbated by the lack of adjustment in downstream privacy choice. Such inadvertent susceptibility to framing effects and the lack of adjustment downstream is of increasing consequence, given the growing usage of personal information in commercial contexts, some of which may be particularly intrusive or even discriminatory. For instance, Sweeney (2013) found that blackidentifying names were 25% more likely to get an online ad suggestive of an arrest record, relative to whiteidentifying names.
Alternate policy approaches might include privacycontrol mechanisms as only one component of privacy protections afforded to consumers. For instance, regulators may also consider simply restricting data practices perceived to be particularly intrusive or potentially harmful to consumers, as well as introducing uniform standards for soliciting consumer choice in emerging privacy contexts where consumer choice is desired. This latter recommendation has precedent in other contexts (e.g., healthcare or finance) in which regulators have provided standardized formats for soliciting consumer consent. In contrast to the current privacy choice mechanisms available to consumers, privacy choice mechanisms for emerging data practices by firms may be informed by a growing literature in behavioral economics focusing on designing choice architectures that aid consumers in improved decision making. These insights have been applied to other contexts by highlevel policy units (e.g., the UK Behavioural Insights Team) with considerable success, and could include framing choice to properly highlight both costs and benefits stemming from the collection and use of personal information and manipulation of choice defaults. These suggestions could limit firms' abilities to manipulate consumers in their own interests, while empowering consumers to make choices that reflect their desired balance of personal privacy and utility from uses of their personal information.
Conclusion
Privacy-protective behavior is not without its costs: consumers choosing more restrictive data settings may do so at the expense of valuable online services, product customization, or tailored advertising and promotions. Understanding these trade-offs and how consumers approach privacy choices is critical, and our understanding continues to evolve. As a result, it remains a challenge to design policies that lead choice architects to create privacy contexts that balance consumer privacy considerations against competing utility gains from data allowances. This challenge is even more daunting when one considers the complexities introduced by heterogeneous and cascaded choices susceptible to subtle manipulations of decision framing. What is clear, however, is that relying on control, offered at the discretion of service providers, as the predominant mechanism for privacy protection may not suffice. The poet Robert Frost described "consent in all the forms" as the "strongest and most effective force in guaranteeing the long-term maintenance of power" where the "dominated acquiesce in their own domination." In line with this notion, if choice mechanisms are not carefully crafted, considered in light of cascaded privacy choice, and provided alongside supplemental protections, they may have largely the effect of quelling consumer privacy concerns by providing the opportunity to restrict the collection and use of their personal information while, in practice, actually implementing policies that result in consumers continuing to provide broad, and potentially harmful, data allowances to firms. Have you ever let a friend drive after you thought he or she had had too much to drink? Yes 3
Appendix. Experimental Materials
Have you ever made up a serious excuse, such as grave illness or death in the family, to get out of doing something? Yes 4
Have you ever stolen anything worth more than $100? No 5
Have you ever had sex in a public venue (e.g., restroom of a club, airplane)? No 6
Have you ever fantasized about doing something terrible (e.g., torture) to someone? Yes 7
Have you ever looked at pornographic material? Yes 8
Have you ever downloaded a pirated song from the internet? No Your responses in this study will be stored unencrypted. Your responses in this study will be shown to other participants of the study. Your responses in this study will be shared with religious organizations interested in evaluating personal ethics. Your responses will be published on a research bulletin openly available on the internet. a One risky disclosure setting was selected at random to present to participants in this condition.
Endnotes
1 https://staysafeonline.org/data-privacy-day/check-your-privacy -settings. 2 For instance, users may be given the choice to restrict which other users view their personal information but not how the service uses their personal information for advertising. 3 Consider an example unrelated to privacy. In 2010, regulators required that banks halt practices of levying, by default, exorbitant fees for consumers who overdrafted their accounts. In response to the requirement that consumers be defaulted into a regime in which they would not be able to overdraw their accounts via ATM withdrawals, banks presented to their customers the choice to continue to be able to overdraft and incur these fees as the option to enroll in "overdraft protection." A survey of more than 6,000 people administered by the Pew Center following implementation of the regulation found that large numbers of people had fallen for the ruse, despite their preference for having such transactions declined (Pew Center on the States 2012). 4 http://www.businessinsider.com/teens-prefer-snapchat-and-instagram -over-facebook-2016-10. 5 http://www.marketwatch.com/story/snapchats-new-scary-privacy -policy-has-left-users-outraged-2015-10-29;
https://www.wired .com/2014/10/the-snappening-is-not-your-fault. 6 We restricted participants to subjects from the United States with a hit approval rate on AMT of over 95%. We included attention check questions at the start of the questionnaire following accepted practices in the field (e.g., Oppenheimer et al. 2009 ). We also included a screening survey that both prevented individuals from participating in a given experiment multiple times and prevented individuals from participating in more than one experiment. 7 We opt for a linear probability model estimation in lieu of a nonlinear estimation approach (e.g., logit) to avoid inaccurate coefficient and standard error estimates for interaction effects in nonlinear regression models (Ai and Norton 2003) . Angrist and Pischke (2008) have shown little qualitative difference between the logit and linear probability specification. 8 We selected a subset of three permissions to avoid the potential of a high number of permissions triggering privacy concerns for individuals. Elevated baseline concerns may impact framing effects, lead participants to drop out of the study, or cause participants to make their choices arbitrarily (e.g., accept or reject all permissions). 9 Including dummies for actual settings presented accounts for any breaks in randomization for the subset of permissions shown to participants. 10 These questions were intended to elicit a level of quasi-identifiability, such that participants would not perceive disclosure as being entirely risk-free. In exit questions, several participants commented that disclosing their geographic location did, in fact, make them uncomfortable in answering some of the questions on ethical behavior. 11 Unsurprisingly, participants presented with low-importance settings also did not exhibit differences in their self-disclosure. 12 https://www.reddit.com/r/mturk/comments/2hqfvp/your_turk _id_is_not_anonymous/. http://turkernation.com/archive/index.php/ t-17525.html.
